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What’s the matter with memes? 
Robert Aunger 
LSHTM 
 
I’m old enough to be one of the first generation of people brought to the ‘gene’s-eye-view’ of 
biology by reading The Selfish Gene. It changed my outlook on life and has had a profound 
influence on my subsequent thinking. This transformative experience has been reproduced in 
many thousands of readers over the past 30 years. Oddly enough, for someone who has 
studied memes, I don’t remember being particularly taken with the final chapter, ‘The Long 
Reach of the Gene’, at the time. What transported me then was the profound general outlook 
the book provided on why social interactions work the way they do. My professional concerns 
with the meme concept, introduced by Dawkins in that last chapter, came later, when I became 
interested in understanding cultural change. 
 
A meme, of course, is defined as the fundamental unit of cultural transmission. From an 
evolutionary perspective, it plays the role in cultural change equivalent to that of the gene in 
biological change: as the basic unit of inheritance allowing the accumulation of adaptations. 
The idea is that, like a gene, a meme is a replicator (a concept also first defined by Richard 
Dawkins in The Selfish Gene). Genes replicate through the duplication of DNA strands; cultural 
replication, or the duplication of memes, takes place through the social transmission of 
information.  
 
Dawkins was not the first scholar to broach the idea that culture might be underpinned by the 
replication of bits of information. The idea had been in the air for some time, with a variety of 
linguistic novelties being coined to describe a cultural replicator over the years: ‘culturgen’, 
‘mnemotype’, ‘culturetype’ and ‘sociogene’. But Dawkins’ use of the word ‘meme’ caught on. 
Indeed the story of the spread of the meme meme makes a good case history in memetics (the 
study of memes). 
 
To show the success of his invention, Dawkins (1999) did a web search in 1998 in which 
‘memetic’ (used to eliminate possible confusion with the French word ‘même’) returned 5,000 
web pages while ‘culturgen’ (the main contemporary rival, fashioned by Lumsden and Wilson in 
their book Genes, Mind and Culture) returned only 20. In the intervening seven years, the 
comparative advantage of meme has increased dramatically: memetic now appears on over 
168,000 web-pages, while culturgen (or culturegen) lags with 537; other alternatives are nearly 
invisible. The ‘meme’ has won the contest to be the accepted name for the fundamental unit of 
culture. (A particularly convincing sign is the fact that E.O. Wilson uses ‘meme’ seven times in 
his book Consilience, while mentioning his own coinage, ‘culturgen’, only once.) The reason 
could be purely semantic: ‘culturgen’ is harder to say, while ‘meme’ easily blossoms into 
‘memeplex’ or ‘meme pool’. On the other hand, perhaps the term’s success is due to the fact 
that millions of people have now read The Selfish Gene. 
 
The memetic banner has since been carried forward by a growing battalion. Since The Selfish 
Gene was first published, a number of books (by Blackmore, Dennett, Distin and myself) 
(Dennett 1991, 1995; Blackmore 1999; Aunger 2001, 2002; Distin 2004), numerous articles, an 
electronic journal (the Journal of Memetics) and countless web postings and pages have been 
devoted to developing the meme meme.  
 
However, when he introduced the idea, Dawkins’ wasn’t intending to inspire a new field of 
speculation and research; he was actually introducing an example of a second replicator, to 
show that Darwinian replication is not confined to genes alone (Dawkins 1999). He suggested 
that successful memes, like other replicators, should exhibit three crucial characteristics: 
fidelity, fecundity, and longevity (Dawkins 1976). Fidelity refers to the ability of a replicator to 
retain its information content as it passes from mind to mind. Fecundity is a measure of a 
replicator’s power to induce copies of itself to be made. Longevity is less crucial; it only 
suggests that memes which survive longer have more opportunities to be copied, so the 
number of their offspring can increase too.  
 
The meme meme seems to have these qualities in spades. Indeed, the meme idea has spread 
through both ‘high brow’ and popular culture, being used in a variety of ways by different 
disciplines or interest groups. For example, changes in the frequency with which the birds in an 
area sing elements of their song has been studied by animal behaviourists as a kind of 
‘population memetics’ (by analogy to the study of changes in gene frequencies in population 
genetics). Similarly, computer scientists have argued that enabling one robot to imitate the 
behaviour another (‘meme copying’) is a way to get robots to develop ‘culture’. Inspiring 
customers to spread good word-of-mouth about their products is also seen by some business 
writers as an exciting new tactic for increasing sales – a process they believe takes advantage 
of ‘meme power’. Most infamously, perhaps, theologians have reacted to Dawkins’ well-known 
atheistic stance and espousal of religious beliefs as harmful ‘mind viruses’ with defences of 
their beliefs – as in the book by John Bowker debating the question Is God a Virus? 
 
Nevertheless, no significant body of empirical research has grown up around the meme 
concept (the bird-song work being the sole, limited exception), nor has memetics made 
empirically testable propositions or generated much in the way of novel experimental or 
observational data. In fact the memetic literature remains devoted almost exclusively to 
theoretical antagonisms, internecine battles, and scholastic elucidations of prior writings on 
memes. This is typically the sign of a science in search of a subject matter.  
 
Why is memetic science ailing? I think most of the problems have to do with the lack of a useful 
definition. I would like to spend my time in this brief essay attempting to clarify this basic issue. 
As we will see, getting specific about the nature of memes leads to questions about whether 
there is indeed any subject matter for memetics to study. 
  
So just what is a meme? Dawkins famously argued in The Selfish Gene that memes could be 
“tunes, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches”. This 
definition allowed memes to be found in various kinds of things: inside people’s heads, in 
people’s behaviour, and in artefacts. Susan Blackmore (2003) agrees with this broad definition 
in her book The Meme Machine, and argues that memes are implicated in the origins of human 
biology (particularly our large brains), culture (especially language, religion, art) and technology 
(which has become more and more efficient at copying and multiplying memes in artefacts like 
books and the World Wide Web). Basically, she sees memes as driving just about every 
interesting aspect of human evolution. This makes memes very powerful indeed. The problem 
is that, if memes explain everything, then they explain nothing. This sort of catch-all definition is 
too broad to be scientifically useful, and, I believe, accounts for memetics being empirically 
moribund at present.  
 
I have argued, on the contrary, that what makes the meme concept special as an account of 
cultural evolution is its role as a replicator in culture (Aunger 2002). This is consistent with 
Dawkins’ original objective in positing the existence of memes as a foil to genes.  
 
The replicator concept has been one of Dawkins’ lasting contributions to evolutionary theory. 
However, finding a way to define replication so that it encompasses all of the known replicators – 
genes, prions, computer viruses and memes – has been difficult. I have suggested (Aunger 
2002) that replication can be defined as a special relationship between a source and a copy such 
that four conditions hold:  
 
•   causation (the source must play some role in bringing about the conditions that lead 
to a copy being made);  
•   similarity (the source and copy must resemble each other in relevant respects);  
•   information transfer (what makes the copy similar to the source must be derived 
from the source); and  
•   duplication (the source and copy must coexist for some time).  
 
What does this definition of replication imply about the nature of memes? Does it restrict their 
definition in a useful way? I believe it does, but it will take a bit of analysis to see why.  
 
Dawkins, like other memeticists, has argued that memes, like other replicators, can exist in 
many different forms. In effect, replicators are seen as symbolic entities which can morph from 
one form to another. Dawkins and others tell stories like the following, in which a gene is 
duplicated in a rather complicated fashion. Imagine a gene sequencing machine has ‘decoded’ 
a stretch of DNA into the familiar sequence of Gs,As,Ts and Cs (e.g., ‘GCATACGATA’). This 
sequence is then printed onto a piece of paper, which is subsequently fed into another machine 
which reconstructs the same sequence of amino acids that made up the original DNA. That 
newly-created length of DNA is finally inserted into the nucleus of a cell and begins to function 
as evolution has designed it to.  
 
In this example, the gene appears to have gone from being a portion of DNA to a sequence of 
markings on paper, then back to DNA. In effect, one code has been translated into another and 
back again, with the two different codes being realized in two different physical substrates. 
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the two coding systems, each of which has 
only four values, so high fidelity conversion back and forth is not difficult to achieve. 
 
But let’s look at this story more closely. There is certainly a causal chain in which information 
from one stretch of DNA is transferred to another stretch of DNA through the intermediate step 
of being stored symbolically on paper. Thinking of information in an abstract way suggests that 
the gene has been converted to a paper form, and that information inheritance has occurred: 
the crucial information seems to have been passed right down the line from one ‘real’ gene to 
another. However, it also appears nonsensical in evolutionary terms to argue that the symbol 
sequence on paper is a gene: the paper form does not conserve the essential features of a 
gene, its evolved functions (Hull and Wilkins 2001). In particular, the sequence of symbols can’t 
produce a protein, or regulate the operation of other genes, no matter what environment the 
piece of paper is put in. That is because, in a different coding system on a different physical 
medium, this capability is lost. The symbol string does, however, hold information about a 
gene, which is used by specialized machinery as the basis for putting together the proper 
sequence of amino acids constituting that gene. So DNA à paper à DNA represents a causal 
chain, but not an evolutionary lineage. This is because a lineage should constitute a sequence 
of copies, each of which is able to make further copies of things like itself – that is, working 
replicators, all along the line (Hull and Wilkins 2001).  
 
How can we reconcile the fact that there is causation, information transfer and the duplication 
of DNA in this sequence but no evolutionary lineage? The only replication condition this 
example fails, according to our definition of replication above, is similarity: one copy must be 
‘like’ the next. Is this lack of similarity due to the change in code from DNA to paper? Actually, 
there is a change in code during ‘normal’ DNA replication and expression: the duplication and 
transcription of DNA strands involve RNA (as primers or messengers, respectively); but RNA 
works via a slightly different coding scheme than DNA (changing one of the four nucleotides). 
There are also cases in which the replication of cultural information involves code-switching; for 
example, one can change codes of music from mp3 to wma or other forms while duplicating 
files. But all of these music codes are digital (two symbols only) and exist on the same medium: 
magnetic memory in a music player or computer.  
 
So it isn’t the change in code that matters to replication; it is the change in substrate. 
Replication appears to be substrate-specific (Aunger 2002). This is probably due to the fact that 
replication is a rather fragile process, a specialized kind of duplication which requires precise 
management – which means the beginning and end states must be physically similar, based in 
the same kind of substance. Certainly, no known replicator can replicate on more than one 
substrate: genes in DNA, prions as proteins, and computer viruses in computer memory. 
Presumably the same condition holds for memes, if they are replicators. 
 
What is the proper substrate for memes then?  It is commonly accepted that the primary 
repository of memes is brains. Why? Because memes are supposed to explain cultural change, 
and the quintessential cultural traits such as beliefs and values which distinguish one culture 
from another are in people’s heads. Presumably for reasons like this, Dawkins, in his second 
book, The Extended Phenotype, restricted a meme to being ‘a unit of information residing in the 
brain’.  
 
But we still have a conceptual problem: if replicators are restricted to single substrates, how 
can we explain processes in which replicators appear to switch substrates, as in our story 
about a gene above? If genes don’t exist in artefacts, then how can we account for a life history 
in which a gene passes through a phase in which it exists only as a piece of paper? How can a 
second copy of DNA acquire its genetic information (in our story above) if it has had no contact 
with its creator, the original bit of DNA? The answer is that the gene must be reconstructed 
from the information that is present in the symbolic sequence on paper, and which bears some 
relationship to the gene sequence. Fancy machines must reverse engineer the gene from the 
information on the piece of paper.  
 
I have argued that a similar process occurs in the case of memes: when someone reads a 
book, and thereby acquires the author’s ideas without ever meeting the author face-to-face, the 
book has served as a template, holding information which creates complex visual signals 
which, when perceived by the reader, instigates the reconstruction of the author’s memes in the 
reader’s mind (Aunger 2002). Just as the gene in the story above is reconstituted in DNA 
based on a paper-based representation, so too can a meme be reconstructed from a 
representation found on a piece of paper in a book.  
 
Even face-to-face communication relies on the ability of human minds to engage in the 
reconstruction of information. This is because brains don’t come into direct contact with one 
another. To jump the gap between minds, memes must use a signalling system, such as 
speech. This in turn means that message receivers must reconstruct a meme from the 
information contained in the signals it produces. The central question then is whether this 
mental reconstruction process can result in a copy of the original meme being produced – 
whether reconstruction satisfies the conditions for a replication process outlined above. 
 
At present, it is difficult to know because we don’t currently understand how social learning 
occurs. However, there are suggestions, largely from linguistics – the study of the most 
sophisticated natural signalling system known -- that ‘copying the product’ (as Blackmore calls 
it) is a process fraught with difficulty. The information contained in a message is rarely sufficient 
to establish its meaning. Each instance of listening to someone else requires inferring not only 
the semantic content of the message, but also the intentions of the speaker, which may bear 
little relationship to the message. For example, ironic communication is based on saying the 
reverse of what you mean (e.g., “I love your hairdo”). To make sure that the communication 
results in the receiver interpreting a message in something like the way the speaker intends, 
there have to be complex regularizing mechanisms (to eliminate spurious or extraneous 
elements) and a lot of shared background knowledge. So interpersonal communication is an 
instance of the same kind of process as learning from artefacts: a constructive process based 
on inadequate signals -- but this time received from an active, as opposed to an inert, 
interlocutor. 
 
Even the most efficient form of social learning, imitation, which is supposed to ensure high-
fidelity copying, is likely to introduce variation into what is learned (Sperber 2000). Exact 
copying is not a feature to be expected of everyday human communication because the signals 
we send are highly impoverished compared to what we infer from them. Certainly, many of the 
experimental studies of cultural transmission show rapid decay in messages, and reversion to 
‘lowest common denominator’ content (Mesoudi 2005). If this is the case, it seems unlikely that 
culture can be viewed productively as the creation of lineages of information transmission with 
high-fidelity duplication and the long-term maintenance of cultural content. Human 
communication systems are thus unlikely to involve replicator-like inheritance – at least in the 
preponderance of cases. As a result, there may be no such thing as memes, in the strict sense. 
 
More fundamentally, communication, when seen from an evolutionary point of view, is not 
designed to result in the copying of information. Another of Dawkins’ major contributions was to 
point out that communication is a form of signalling designed to manipulate the minds, and 
hence the behaviour, of other animals (Dawkins and Krebs 1978). It is often in an individual’s 
interest to get others to behave in ways which provide them benefits they can’t achieve for 
themselves. This can be achieved by sending others information about a purported change in 
circumstance on which those individuals will then feel they should act. In some cases, what the 
communicator wishes won’t be in the best interests of those listening, so the communicator will 
want to hide his or her true ambition -- not only from the message receivers, but often from 
themselves as well, so as to more ‘honestly’ signal their apparent, deceptive intent (Trivers 
2000). From the message receiver’s point of view, it will be important to make sure others are 
not trying to influence you in detrimental ways. Message receivers will only care about copying 
what is in someone else’s head if that information is relevant to them, in their situation. But this 
won’t often be the case, given that individuals are typically in different situations, with different 
interests (Sperber and Wilson 1995).  
 
From this perspective, communication is not a peaceful exchange of information but rather tacit 
interpersonal warfare using information as a weapon. Of course when genetic or social 
interests overlap, communication can be cooperative, and information copying might be a 
desired outcome of message passing between cooperators. However, most cooperation 
requires people to adopt complementary, rather than similar, roles. Think of a simple example: 
two people trying to move a piano upstairs, one going backwards, the other forwards. Here, 
most of the shouting is about persuading the partner to move their bit of the piano to the left or 
right. Even in such cases, it doesn’t seem necessary to know what is in the other fellow’s mind 
to succeed. The knowledge of each cooperator can remain quite distinct.  
 
Of course, even if communication isn’t about replicating knowledge, memes might still be able 
to parasitize the communication process in order to duplicate themselves. However, if the 
objective of communication is primarily to manipulate those with different interests to oneself, 
natural selection should be expected to have evolved mechanisms for persuading others, not 
for copying information. So it might be difficult for memes to find ways to replicate information 
when duplication facilities have not evolved.  
 
There is another difficulty to mention. We have relied throughout this discussion on the 
commonsensical assumption that memes occupy slots in the brain for different cultural traits. 
For example, the meme meme is one candidate for the ‘name of unit of cultural transmission’ 
slot, competing with culturgen as well as other terms as possible values. Folk psychology 
suggests the existence of such a concept, but perhaps the brain doesn’t work that way; 
perhaps it represents information rather differently than the analogy to a filing system would 
imply. This possibility opens whole new vistas for what memes might be in conceptual terms: 
not units of language like words or even abstractions like concepts (such as the meme meme), 
but something our conscious minds cannot conceive of – perhaps something as alien to folk 
psychology as the computer representation of words in binary digits (Aunger 2002). The whole 
project of counting words on web pages or even instances of mental concepts in brains may be 
misguided. My own view is that memetics can only really take off once we have a better idea of 
how brains manage information, much like biology blossomed after the discovery of the DNA-
based mechanism of gene replication. However, if it turns out that social learning typically 
doesn’t involve the replication of information, then models of cultural evolution other than 
memetics will be necessary.  
 
For a number of reasons, then, the replication of information is unlikely to be how most social 
learning occurs. Neither are memes necessary to explain cultural traditions. Henrich and Boyd 
(2002) have shown that even if copying is sloppy when individuals communicate with each 
other, the result of lots of sloppy social learning, when aggregated to the population level, can 
appear like a replication-based process in the sense that cultural traditions can still be 
maintained and adaptations can accumulate over time. This is true if one assumes that human 
psychology includes a tendency to favour the acquisition of specific trait values, or what 
Sperber calls ‘cultural attractors’. Thus, even if memes aren’t at work in culture, it can appear 
as if they were. So taking the stability of culture as prima facie evidence of the existence of 
memes is mistaken. Replication is not a necessary component of an interesting Darwinian 
process, and may not be involved in the explanation of human culture. Dawkins (1982a) 
presaged a similar conclusion long ago: “My own feeling is that its main value [the meme 
hypothesis] may lie not so much in helping us to understand human culture as in sharpening 
our perspective of genetic natural selection”. My attempt to provide a more precise definition of 
memes has, ironically, shown that memetics appears to be in search of subject matter because 
its central claim, the meme hypothesis, lacks substance. 
 
A final speculation about the fate of memes: even if it turns out that there are no mental 
replicators, it will be difficult to deny memes a role in the future of cultural evolutionary studies. 
This is because the meme meme has already become part of the culture it was supposed to 
explain – as attested by the frequency of its mention on the Web. I therefore suspect people 
will continue to use the word ‘meme’ in a vague way when discussing cultural change. But I 
also predict that memetics is unlikely ever to become an empirical science, because when we 
define memes in a manner precise enough to start making testable predictions, we find that we 
have largely defined them out of existence.  
 
The last chapter of The Selfish Gene has thus proven incredibly provocative, and productive – 
at least in the sense of having spawned renewed interest, and a burgeoning literature, in the 
evolution of culture. At minimum, the meme concept has shown how evolutionary biology 
provides a model for the study of a central concept in the social sciences: culture. Interestingly, 
Dawkins (1982b) suggested that any process which showed design was likely to be due to the 
natural selection of random variants -- a principle he called 'Universal Darwinism’.  Some have 
taken this idea as a rallying cry, and used the meme concept as part of a general programme 
to apply Darwinian principles to the disciplines bordering on biology, particularly psychology 
and the social sciences. This kind of theoretical unification is highly desirable, if only for the 
parsimonious explanations it provides for a broad range of phenomena. But of course the idea 
that Darwinian theory can better account for the subject matter of a discipline than theories 
home-grown in that discipline itself has been fiercely resisted as a form of territorial imperialism 
by those whose territory is being contested (e.g., Sahlins 1976; Kitcher 1985). Nevertheless, 
the success of evolutionary psychology and cultural evolutionism are clear indications of the 
rapid spread of what might be called the ‘Universal Darwinian programme’ – and testimony to 
the fertile theoretical mind of Richard Dawkins.  
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